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Takeaways of the Day

• Venezuela – Two powerful earthquakes (magnitude 7.2 and 7.5) struck north-central Venezuela on 24 June 2026 in a rare ‘seismic doublet,’ collapsing buildings in Caracas, closing Maiquetía airport.

• Cuba –The US State Department’s 23 June designation of five GAESA-linked Cuban entities.

• Colombia – Cepeda concedes presidential runoff.

• Perú – Keiko Fujimori Secures Decisive Lead.

VENEZUELA

Twin Earthquakes Devastate North-Central Venezuela; Oil Infrastructure Initially Spared [High]

Two earthquakes of magnitudes 7.2 and 7.5 struck about 39 seconds apart west of Caracas on 24 June 2026, in what the USGS termed a ‘seismic doublet,’ collapsing buildings in the capital and damaging Maiquetía airport. Interim President Delcy Rodríguez declared a state of emergency, reporting at least 32 dead and over 700 injured—figures expected to rise—with La Guaira state declared a ‘disaster zone.’

Crucially, Venezuela’s oil infrastructure did not appear immediately affected: authorities near the Lake Maracaibo hub reported no injuries, and the El Palito refinery near the epicenter reported no damage, though one source noted that extended power loss could affect crude output.

Significance: USGS economic-loss modeling of $10-100 billion and any prolonged grid outage threaten Venezuelan crude output and reconstruction financing exposure; energy majors including Shell are still assessing fields.

Sources: Mercopress · Caracas Chronicles · El Pais America

U.S., EU, China and Brazil Mobilize Quake Aid as Caracas-Washington Engagement Deepens [High]

Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the immediate dispatch of U.S. rescue teams and humanitarian aid, while President Trump said the U.S. was ‘ready, willing and able to help’ its ‘new and great friends.’

The European Union, China, Brazil’s Lula, and Israel also offered assistance; chef José Andrés pledged $1 million through World Central Kitchen. Relief diplomacy unfolds against the backdrop of the U.S.-installed interim government and ongoing negotiations on Venezuelan oil-sector cooperation following Maduro’s January 2026 capture.

Significance: Coordinated Western and Chinese aid signals competing influence over Venezuela’s reconstruction and oil reopening, shaping which counterparties gain access; deepening U.S. engagement supports the thesis that sanctions relief and re-entry for U.S. energy firms are eventual.

Sources: El Nacional · Mercopress · El Nacional

COLOMBIA

Cepeda Concedes Presidential Runoff to Trump-Backed De la Espriella [High]

Leftist candidate Iván Cepeda conceded defeat on 24 June 2026, ahead of the formal vote count’s conclusion, accepting results that differed little from the preliminary tally. Right-wing outsider Abelardo ‘El Tigre’ de la Espriella, endorsed by President Trump, won the 21 June runoff with roughly 49.7% versus Cepeda’s 48.7%—a margin of about 250,000 votes.

De la Espriella, who takes office on 7 August, has pledged to boost the oil and gas sector, lower taxes, end peace talks with armed groups, and restore ties with Israel.

Significance: The rightward shift is bullish for Colombian hydrocarbons, oil investment and U.S.-Colombia security alignment, reversing Petro’s oil-project moratorium; however, a divided Congress and high public debt may dilute reform, and lingering OFAC sanctions on Petro complicate the transition.

Sources: Colombia Reports

Anomalous 100% Vote Tables Spur Calls for Scrutiny in Conflict Zones [Medium]

El Tiempo reported on 25 June 2026 that authorities are examining atypical polling tables where 100% of votes went to either Iván Cepeda or Abelardo de la Espriella, with experts warning of possible voter coercion in armed-conflict zones. Former Justice Minister Andrés González noted that unanimous tallies can be legitimate but warrant review when repeated across tables in militarized areas.

Significance: Post-election integrity disputes pose tail risk to a smooth transition and could prolong political uncertainty, a modest near-term drag on COP and Colombian asset sentiment even as the result is widely expected to hold.

Sources: El Tiempo · El Tiempo

CUBA

State Department Designates Five GAESA-Linked Entities, Tightening Sanctions Net [High]

On 23 June 2026, the U.S. State Department designated five entities and one individual under E.O. 14404, targeting GAESA’s revenue network, the Cuban military conglomerate. The designees include the logistics firm Almacenes Universales S.A. (which controls container traffic at the Mariel port zone), Banco Financiero Internacional, RAFIN S.A., the mining firm Geominera S.A., and the steelmaker Empresa Siderúrgica José Martí (Antillana de Acero). All property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and secondary sanctions risk extends to foreign persons dealing with them.

Significance: Blocking BFI—which handles most foreign transactions in and out of Cuba—and Mariel’s port operator sharply increases secondary-sanctions risk for any non-U.S. firm or bank engaged in trade, logistics, mining, or banking with Cuba.

Sources: Cuba Trade · Cuba Trade

Exxon Wins at U.S. Supreme Court Against Cuban State Companies Under Helms-Burton [High]

On 23 June 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Exxon’s favor in a Helms-Burton Act suit against Cuban state companies CUPET and CIMEX over assets confiscated in 1960. Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion held that the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, so plaintiffs need not also satisfy a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exception. Exxon is seeking more than $1 billion in damages.

Significance: The ruling materially lowers the bar for U.S. nationals to sue Cuban state entities and their foreign partners that ‘traffic’ in confiscated property, increasing litigation and counterparty risk for any company doing business with Cuban state enterprises.

Sources: Cuba Trade

Cuba’s Paris Club Debt Rises to $4.795 Billion [Medium]

CubaNet reported on 24 June 2026 that Cuba’s debt to the Paris Club rose to $4.795 billion, with successive reschedulings negotiated by Havana failing to reduce the reported balance. The data underscores the island’s deepening fiscal and external-financing strains amid an ongoing energy crisis.

Significance: Rising arrears signal continued sovereign-credit distress and limited access to external financing.

Sources: CubaNet

PERU

Keiko Fujimori Secures Decisive Lead in Razor-Thin Presidential Race [Medium]

After a weeks-long count of the 7 June runoff, conservative Popular Force leader Keiko Fujimori has gained an insurmountable lead over leftist Roberto Sánchez, with overseas ballots proving decisive, according to reporting on 25 June 2026.

Fujimori said her goal is to reunite a Peru ‘split in two,’ while Sánchez has alleged voter fraud and signaled he may not recognize the result. Fujimori campaigned on a tough-on-crime agenda and a staunch defense of Peru’s market-oriented economic model.

Significance: A Fujimori presidency is broadly market-friendly and supportive of Peru’s mining and investment climate, while her pragmatic stance preserves trade ties with both the U.S. and China; however, Sánchez’s fraud claims and deep polarization pose governability and near-term sol volatility risk.

Sources: Folha de Sao Paulo

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

On 23 June 2026, the U.S. State Department designated five entities and one individual: Almacenes Universales S.A., Banco Financiero Internacional, RAFIN S.A., the mining firm Geominera S.A., and the steelmaker Empresa Siderúrgica José Martí (Antillana de Acero).

No other sanctions changes reported in the Améяicas.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) W26 - 25.06.26

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly important to the global economy. ¡Viva Las Améяicas!

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Smoke on the Moskva: The War Comes Home to Roost

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In last week’s BWA, I discussed the great power competition - The Panda and Uncle Sam - over Perú and Citizen Ana de la Cruz’s election preference. Ana will be the judge over the power competition - money in her pocket and food on the table, who is going to deliver it?

In this week’s BWA, the Venezuela Experiment. Three phases of reconstruction and assets in play, security services pieces moving, and collaboration with US forces.

The Venezuela Experiment: Assets Redistribution & Collections

Takeaways

Opportunities — US control turns Russia’s stranded oil-JV stakes into a distressed asset: worth roughly $0 to Moscow, but ~

$2–3 billion to a Washington-approved special-situations suitor who can operate and sell the crude.

Risks — Every deal rests on US commitment and an unelected government. A future US administration could deprioritize the hemisphere, and an elected Venezuelan successor could void today’s agreements under the odious-debt doctrine.

Uncle Sam’s Three-Phase Plan

Shortly after US forces extracted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from Caracas and transported him to a New York prison, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlined a three-phase plan for Venezuela’s economic and political reconstruction.

As Rubio described the plan to the US Congress on 7 January, the overlapping phases would begin with stabilization, followed by recovery and transition.

The stabilization phase, focused on preventing the country from descending into economic chaos, has largely been achieved through US control of Venezuela’s oil exports and export revenues. The US has been exerting leverage by controlling the flow of cash and oil in and out of the country — as Rubio put it, “in a way that benefits the Venezuelan people, not corruption, not the regime.”

There appears to be some success — the economy has not completely collapsed — but it remains unclear how much the Venezuelan people are actually benefiting from the new US cash-control system. After all, the money is eventually released back into the same corrupt Chavista system that was siphoning the life out of the people to begin with.

The second, overlapping phase — recovery — is underway. The Hydrocarbons Reform Law was recently passed to ‘ensure that American and other Western companies have fair access to Venezuela’s oil markets,’ so says Rubio. Some political prisoners have been released, and some have visited the country. Rubio has specified that this phase requires the establishment of an independent press and political parties, as well as the creation of a new electoral commission. Last week, that latter step appeared to make progress, with an unprecedented meeting between exiled 2015 National Assembly president Dinorah Figuera and National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez. The two agreed to establish a ‘credible’ National Electoral Council. Figuera, by the way, still has an outstanding arrest warrant issued by the Chavista government.

Transition is the third and least-defined phase. When Rubio first laid out the plan, he described it as being up to Venezuelans to choose their government, without articulating specific conditions or sequencing. Yet it appears to be underway already.

Transition Train Leaving the Station

On the same day the US announced it had collaborated with the Venezuelan armed forces to eliminate Tren de Aragua leader Héctor Guerrero Flores (AKA “Niño Guerrero”), Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General Albert Ramdin held a working meeting in Washington with opposition leader María Corina Machado to discuss recent developments and next steps in Venezuela’s transition. The meeting was striking in both timing and significance: the region’s main multilateral body engaging Machado directly as the opposition’s lead figure — while the US State Department was simultaneously elevating Dinorah Figuera as an alternative interlocutor with the Rodríguez government, underscoring Uncle Sam’s influence and options for Venezuela’s future.

The collaboration between the US military and the Venezuelan armed forces — the first in more than two decades — signals a US trust-building and vetting process of counterparties within the Venezuelan security institutions. The Venezuelan military has more than 2,000 generals, many with economic interests in illegal mining, narcotics trafficking, and protection income from Colombian insurgents such as the ELN and FARC along the Venezuelan–Colombian border. Who in the Venezuelan military and security apparatus can US forces trust? That vetting and purging process has begun — so expect more such collaborations, and likely Colombian armed-forces cooperation as well, given the election of Abelardo de la Espriella.

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Takeaways of the Day

• Colombia – Abelardo de la Espriella narrowly won the presidential runoff with roughly 49.7% versus Iván Cepeda’s 48.7%, a margin of less than 250,000 votes. Cepeda is contesting some 33,000 ballot boxes.

• Cuba – A fire disrupted the flagship Mariel container terminal, Cuba’s sole such facility.

• Venezuela – Acting administration under Delcy Rodríguez launched a public-sector ‘reengineering’ plan stoking layoff fears.

COLOMBIA

De la Espriella Wins Razor-Thin Runoff; Left Contests Results [High]

On 21 June 2026, far-right outsider Abelardo de la Espriella won Colombia’s presidential runoff with about 49.7% against Iván Cepeda’s 48.7%, a margin of fewer than 250,000 votes.

Cepeda acknowledged the preliminary count but said results are not final and announced his party will challenge results from roughly 33,000 of 122,000 polling stations. De la Espriella, endorsed by U.S. President Trump, takes office 7 August 2026.

Significance: A pro-hydrocarbons, lower-tax administration is constructive for Colombian oil/gas equities, energy investment and U.S.-Colombia trade normalization, but the recount and a divided Congress create transition-period uncertainty through the August handover.

Sources: Al Jazeera · Colombia Reports · Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

Cepeda to Challenge 27% of Ballot Boxes as Petro Alleges Fraud [High]

Cepeda said party lawyers are challenging some 33,000 of 122,200 ballot boxes, about 27% of the total. Outgoing President Gustavo Petro called for a full vote count and publicly alleged irregularities, though international observers and the electoral authority’s record make a reversal seem highly unlikely.

Significance: A protracted scrutiny process and street-mobilization risk could weigh on the Colombian peso and sovereign risk premia in the near term.

Sources: Colombia Reports · El Tiempo

President-Elect’s Business Record and Agenda Draw Scrutiny [High]

De la Espriella, a millionaire criminal-defense lawyer and political newcomer, has pledged to resume fracking, reverse Petro’s moratorium on new hydrocarbon and mining contracts, lower taxes, and cut the state apparatus by up to 40%. He has said he would preserve Petro’s minimum-wage increase and seek to repair relations with Washington, while questions persist about his finances and dual citizenship.

Significance: The fracking/mining reopening and tax-cut platform are positive for upstream energy and extractive investment theses, but governing without an automatic legislative majority limits deliverability and raises the prospect of rule-by-decree legal battles that could deter long-horizon capital commitments.

Sources: NPR · Al Jazeera · BBC Mundo

CUBA

Fire Disrupts Operations at Mariel Container Terminal [High]

On 22 June 2026, a fire broke out at the yard of the Mariel Container Terminal, Cuba’s sole facility of its kind and the centerpiece of the Mariel Special Development Zone, according to state media. The incident occurred around 09:30ET, was brought under control, with staff evacuated and no injuries. It came less than 24 hours after the terminal had denied social-media rumors of an emergency.

Significance: Mariel is Cuba’s primary FDI showcase and container gateway; even a minor disruption underscores operational and infrastructure-vulnerability risk for any investor or shipper exposed to the zone, compounding existing U.S. sanctions and energy constraints on Cuban trade connectivity.

Sources: Cuba Headlines · CubaNet

Assembly Advances 176-Point Economic Transformation Package [Medium]

Cuba’s National Assembly reviewed 176 transformation proposals across 23 axes, presented 18 June 2026, by PM Manuel Marrero Cruz, covering banking liberalization, private and foreign capital in fuel imports, successive currency devaluations, partial dollarization, VAT introduction, and decentralized foreign-trade powers. The plan would affect more than 148 legal provisions and require dozens of new laws and decrees; implementation mechanics remain undefined.

Significance: The proposed FX auctions, private exchange houses, foreign-currency accounts, 99-year surface rights and banking opening could materially reshape entry economics for foreign investors—but undefined sequencing, planned devaluations and the sanctions overhang keep execution and convertibility risks high.

Sources: Cuba Trade · Cuba Trade

Ration-Book Access Narrowed as Real Basket Costs 14 Salaries [Medium]

On 22 June 2026, ElToque reported that Cuba is restricting access to the rationing booklet, while the real cost of the basic goods basket is roughly 14 monthly salaries. Officials frame the shift as moving from product subsidies toward targeted personal subsidies, a stated axis of the broader reform program.

Significance: The subsidy unwind signals fiscal stress and rising inflation pass-through, which intensify social instability risk, a relevant overlay for remittance flow.

Sources: ElToque

Delta Wins Stay in Libertad Act Title III Airport-Trafficking Suit [Medium]

On 18 June 2026, Judge Federico Moreno granted Delta Air Lines’ motion to stay discovery in a Cuban Liberty (Libertad) Act Title III lawsuit alleging trafficking in confiscated Cuban airport property. Delta argues that the plaintiff cannot show he acquired control of the claim by 1996 and that a certified claim is dispositive. A motion to dismiss with prejudice was argued the same day.

Significance: Title III litigation remains a live counterparty and contingent-liability risk for any U.S. or multinational firm transacting with confiscated Cuban property; the stay is incrementally favorable to defendants but the dismissal ruling is the item to watch.

Sources: Cuba Trade

VENEZUELA

Acting Government Launches Public-Sector ‘Reengineering’ Plan [Medium]

On 23 June 2026, El Nacional reported that Héctor Rodríguez was designated by the acting president to present a plan for a ‘reengineering of the Venezuelan public sector,’ prompting fear of mass layoffs among state workers. The move comes amid a fluid post-Maduro environment after the January 2026 U.S. military extraction of Nicolás Maduro left acting officials, including Delcy Rodríguez, in nominal charge.

Significance: A public-sector overhaul signals fiscal restructuring and potential labor unrest that bears on Venezuela’s stability premium; for investors eyeing the OFAC-licensed oil and minerals reopening, governance instability remains the binding constraint on deployable capital.

Sources: El Nacional

URUGUAY

Uruguay Signs Accord to Expand Access to Dictatorship-Era Archives [Medium]

On 22 June 2026, Uruguay signed an accord to treat, preserve, and administer archives of human-rights violations committed between 1968 and 1985, deepening a strategic pact among state bodies reached in February. The agreement expands the policy to search for the detained and disappeared from the dictatorship era.

Significance: Largely a domestic human-rights and institutional-governance development with limited direct market impact, but reinforces Uruguay’s reputation for institutional stability—a modest positive for its sovereign and investment-climate narrative.

Sources: MercoPress

MERCOSUR/REGIONAL

Colombia Caps a Regional Rightward, Mano-Dura Shift [High]

On 23 June 2026, El País reported that Colombia’s result adds to a wave in which the right governs in 12 Latin American countries, consolidating hardline security models and US alignment. Analysts note De la Espriella’s narrow margin limits his governing mandate against a deeply divided electorate.

Significance: A region-wide pivot toward pro-business, deregulatory and U.S.-aligned governments is broadly constructive for cross-border deal flow and energy/extractive sectors, but thin mandates and polarization temper the durability of reform agendas.

Sources: El País América · El País América

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

OFAC’s live designation feed could not be retrieved today, but news sourcing confirms a major action.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) W26 - 23.06.26

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The Week’s Key Takeaways

• Economics & Privatization: Cuba has taken steps to reform and liberalize its economy, as Uncle Sam has demanded, but Washington is not buying it. Watch this space as the White House ‘wraps up’ Iran and turns up the heat on Cuba as the US midterm elections approach.

• Energy & Minerals: The US-Iran War slows, with a fragile ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ opening the Strait of Hormuz. Traders will continue to exploit arbitrage opportunities, but LATAM oil producers – Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, etc. – will continue to attract buyers seeking security of supply.

• Foreign Investments: Cuba’s newly approved economic reforms will not attract foreign investors until active US secondary sanctions are lifted. Ditto for Venezuela. Delcy Rodríguez is cooperating with Uncle Sam, but billions of dollars in investment will want to see certainty in a post-Trump and post-Rodríguez administration, and certainty is not on the table.

• Domestic Politics: Abelardo de la Espriella has won the preliminary count in the Colombian presidential runoff. If confirmed, this has a significant impact on the tempo of Venezuela’s economic and political reconstruction and militant groups sheltering along the Venezuelan-Colombian border.

• External Powers & Geopolitics: Watch Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia as Uncle Sam bores with Iran and turns back toward the Western Hemisphere. In particular, the disposition of GAESA assets and Russian and Chinese SOE equity stakes in Venezuela and Cuba.

This Week’s Five

Economics & Privatization

Cuba Ratifies 176-Measure Reform: Equitized State Firms, Private Banks, Digital FX Market Amid 685 CUP/ 1

USD Collapse [High]

On 17-18 June 2026, Cuba’s Communist Party Central Committee and National Assembly approved a 176-measure package—structured across 23 axes—that converted state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies (sociedades mercantiles por acciones) with equity open to Cuban nationals and foreign investors, licensed private and foreign banks under Central Bank supervision, abolished the 100-worker private-firm cap, and launched a real-time digital FX market and a virtual-asset framework.

The package also scrapped generalized price caps that Díaz-Canel conceded had failed to contain inflation and hiked the minimum wage by 53% to 3,210 pesos—still far below independently estimated basic monthly needs of roughly 96,000 pesos. The reforms come amid Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe’s (CEPAL) forecast of a 6.5% GDP contraction for 2026, the informal peso sliding to ~685 CUP/USD (ref., 20 Jun) from 500 in February, and power outages of 20-40 hours daily.

Economists Pavel Vidal and Pedro Monreal flagged the credibility deficit, recalling the failed Tarea Ordenamiento, and noted that every transaction still requires sign-off from the Ministry of Economy and inter-ministerial bodies.

Key Takeaways

• Poverty persists. A 53% minimum-wage hike to 3,210 pesos against ~96,000 pesos in estimated basic monthly needs still means poverty.

• Watch: whether the digital FX market produces a single credible rate. The reform is paper-only.

Sources: Mercopress · Havana Times · ElToque · El Pais America Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

Energy & Minerals

US-Iran Hormuz Deal Sinks Crude, Drags Petrobras (PBR) and Compresses Venezuela’s PDVSA Recovery [High]

The 14-point ‘Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding’ signed 17 June 2026 between the US and Iran—providing for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, at least $300 billion in reconstruction, and a 60-day window to a definitive accord—drove crude sharply lower, with São Paulo’s Ibovespa closing down 0.42% at 170,415 points on 15 June, dragged by Petrobras (PBR).

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Takeaways of the Day

• Cuba –The Cuban Communist Party and National Assembly approved the most sweeping free-market reforms since the 1959 revolution.

• Venezuela – Exiled opposition figure Dinorah Figuera met with National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez to negotiate a ‘credible’ electoral authority.

• Colombia – A tightly contested 21 June presidential runoff between Abelardo de la Espriella and Iván Cepeda is days away.

CUBA

Cuba Approves Sweeping Market Reforms: State Firms, Private Banks, a Digital FX Market [High]

On 17–18 June 2026, Cuba’s Communist Party Central Committee and National Assembly approved a 176-measure package that, on paper, opens the economy further than since the 1959 revolution.

The plan turns state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies (sociedades mercantiles por acciones), allowing Cuban nationals and foreign investors to hold equity stakes, and adds bankruptcy and liquidation procedures. It breaks the state banking monopoly by licensing private and foreign banks, as well as microcredit-focused non-bank institutions, under Central Bank supervision. It also allows a real-time digital foreign-exchange market run by authorized dealers at market rates — an attempt to pull dollar flows out of the informal market (where the peso has blown past 600 CUP/USD) into a regulated, taxable channel, alongside a virtual-asset framework and currency auctions.

Significance: This signals that Havana is attempting to meet market-reform demands from Uncle Sam in exchange for the regime’s survival. Despite the approved reforms, the devil is in the details. Every transaction still requires sign-off from the Ministry of Economy and inter-ministerial bodies, so execution risk is high, and independent Cuban outlets are openly skeptical. Watch two things: digital FX market yields a single credible exchange rate; and how the OFAC/CUPET sanctions overhang collides with the new equity-stake openings.

Sources: Banco Central de Cuba · Havana Times · Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas · CubaNet · OnCubaNews · Al Jazeera

Regime Abandons Price Caps and Hikes Minimum Wage as Economists Doubt Credibility [High]

On 18 June 2026, Díaz-Canel admitted that the government’s price caps failed to contain inflation and often caused products to disappear, prompting their reversal. The package also raises the minimum wage by nearly 50%, though economist Pedro Monreal recalled the failed precedent of the ‘Tarea Ordenamiento,’ and Pavel Vidal warned that the political and institutional implications have not been assumed.

Significance: The pivot signals macro distress and FX/inflation instability that complicates pricing for any new private-sector or import-export counterparty entering under the reform package.

Sources: Havana Times · CubaNet · ElToque

VENEZUELA

Opposition Figure Figuera Returns to Caracas to Negotiate Electoral Body [High]

On 18 June 2026, exiled 2015 National Assembly president Dinorah Figuera returned to Venezuela at the U.S. State Department’s invitation, neutralizing standing Chavista arrest orders against her, and held a first meeting with National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez. The two agreed to establish a parity-based technical and political table with concrete milestones aimed at creating a ‘credible’ National Electoral Council. Figuera also plans to meet U.S. chargé d’affaires John Barrett.

Washington frames the move as a roadmap toward a democratic transition under interim president Delcy Rodríguez, who has governed since the January capture of Maduro.

Significance: This signals that the US State Dept is moving forward with a Venezuelan political reform plan, in coordination with interim President Delcy Rodríguez. A credible electoral track is the prerequisite for sanctions relief and the eventual normalization of Venezuelan oil and financial counterparties—keeping PDVSA exposure, crude flows, and FX repatriation contingent on political reforms.

Sources: MercoPress · El Nacional · Barbershop Whipsers…Las Améяicas

Venezuelan Judicial Reform Launches Under Suspicion of Opaque Rules [Medium]

Reported 19 June 2026, six months after the U.S. military intervention reordered Venezuelan politics, the criminal-justice reform promised by Delcy Rodríguez’s government is generating deep doubts about its real scope. Analysts cite opaque rules and distrust over the reform’s institutional credibility.

Significance: Weak rule-of-law signaling raises counterparty and contract-enforcement risk for any investor weighing re-engagement during the stabilization phase.

Sources: El País América

Analyst Urges Immediate Return of María Corina Machado Amid Chavista Repositioning [Medium]

On 19 June 2026, UCAB political-studies director Benigno Alarcón argued the immediate return of opposition leader María Corina Machado is essential, warning that chavismo is adapting to a post-Maduro reality. He cautioned against accepting an ‘autocratic normality’ in the country.

Significance: Intra-opposition fragmentation between the US-channeled Figuera track and Machado’s bloc adds political-reform execution risk, which underpins sanctions and oil-sector reopening.

Sources: El Nacional

COLOMBIA

Colombia Heads Into Knife-Edge 21 June Presidential Runoff [High]

Colombia votes on 21 June 2026 in a runoff between right-wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella, who led the 31 May first round with about 43.7%, and leftist Historic Pact senator Iván Cepeda with about 40.9%. De la Espriella enters as frontrunner with contained triumphalism while Cepeda counts on late momentum; the winner takes office on 7 August.

Significance: The outcome could redefine US-Colombia security and trade ties—de la Espriella has aligned with Trump on combating ‘transnational crime and the radical left’—directly affecting peso sentiment, counter-narcotics cooperation, and bilateral aid conditionality.

Sources: El Tiempo · El País América

De la Espriella Pledges Trump Alignment as Campaign Faces Finance Scrutiny [Medium]

On 18 June 2026, frontrunner Abelardo de la Espriella responded to a third Trump endorsement, vowing to help fight ‘the radical left.’ Separately, Colombia Reports said his campaign paid roughly $363,720 to an apparent front company, and U.S. HSI arrested a Colombian influencer in Arizona after filing criminal charges tied to the candidate.

Significance: Campaign-finance and legal questions inject headline risk into the frontrunner trade just days before the vote, with potential implications for governability and bilateral optics if he wins.

Sources: Colombia Reports · Colombia Reports

Narcotrafficking Expansion Outpaces Offensives and Negotiations in Cauca [Medium]

Reported 19 June 2026, a decade after the 2016 FARC peace deal, the conflict in the southwestern Cauca province is described by local leaders as far more intense now. Both military offensives and negotiations are failing against armed groups increasingly driven by economic interests.

Significance: Deteriorating rural security feeds directly into the runoff’s central security debate and into counterparty/operational risk for agribusiness, mining, and logistics in affected regions.

Sources: Folha de São PauloSources: Cuba Trade Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

OFAC’s live designation feed could not be retrieved today, but news sourcing confirms a major action.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) W25 - 19.06.26

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Takeaways of the Day

• Venezuelan Oil – The June US–Iran ‘Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding’ to reopen the Strait of Hormuz dropped oil prices sharply, pressuring oil exporters across Latin America.

• Colombia – A knife-edge 21 June presidential runoff between Abelardo de la Espriella and Iván Cepeda is roiled by financing scandals and a US HSI arrest of a Colombian influencer.

• Bolivia – The seven-week blockade crisis has now left at least 16 dead amid acute foreign-currency shortages, with the government calling for talks with unions.

• Cuba – The vice foreign minister publicly warned of US military action threats and reported militarization in Santiago de Cuba.

• Cuban Trademark – A US appeals court affirmed Cubaexport’s win on the Havana Club trademark over Bacardi—though a 2024 US law may block future renewal.

• Sanctions – OFAC issued no new Cuba/Venezuela/Colombia designations over the past seven days, though it refreshed a suite of Venezuela general licenses on 10 June, easing arbitration and governing-law conditions.

VENEZUELA

US–Iran Hormuz Deal Sinks Oil Prices, Clouding Venezuela’s Crude Recovery [High]

On 17 June the US and Iran signed the 14-point ‘Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding’ providing for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, at least $300 billion in reconstruction and the lifting of sanctions, with a 60-day window to negotiate a definitive accord. Oil prices fell sharply on the news. The deal lands as Venezuelan crude output recovers but Washington’s restrictions and inflation keep gains from reaching ordinary Venezuelans.

Significance: A sustained oil-price decline compresses Venezuela’s hard-currency revenue and fiscal headroom just as PDVSA output climbs, raising short-term counterparty and FX risk for traders relying on Venezuelan barrels and for bond restructuring math.

Sources: Mercopress · El Pais America

María Corina Camp Floats Electoral Roadmap as Caracas Weighs Pragmatic Turn [Medium]

María Corina Machado’s chief electoral advisor outlined a preliminary roadmap spanning an independent voter register to a new hybrid voting system.

Separate analysis questions whether Caracas could pivot toward an ‘oil-rich Hungary’ pragmatic foreign policy after two decades of anti-West posture.

Significance: Any credible electoral-transition framework or foreign-policy reset shapes the trajectory of US sanctions relief and the timeline for reopening Venezuela to Western oil and mining investment.

Sources: Caracas Chronicles · Caracas Chronicles

COLOMBIA

Colombia Heads to Knife-Edge 21 June Runoff Between Cepeda and De la Espriella [High]

Colombians vote Sunday 21 June in a presidential runoff between leftist Iván Cepeda, a Petro ally, and Trump-backed far-right outsider Abelardo de la Espriella, who led the 31 May first round with 43.7% to Cepeda’s 40.9%. Third-place finisher Paloma Valencia (6.9%) has endorsed de la Espriella, positioning him as the favorite. The outcome is framed as a compass for South America’s alignment toward or against Washington.

Significance: The result will redefine US–Colombia security, counter-narcotics and trade alignment; a de la Espriella win signals deeper Washington alignment, while a Cepeda win preserves a Colombia–Brazil–Mexico bloc, materially affecting peso sentiment and bilateral deal flow.

Sources: El Tiempo · Agencia Brasil Barberhshop Whispers…Las Améяicas

US HSI Arrests Colombian Influencer After Criminal Charges Against De la Espriella [Medium]

US Homeland Security Investigations agents arrested prominent Colombian influencer Beto Coral at his Arizona home after he filed criminal charges against far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, according to a 17 June Colombia Reports account. The arrest, captured on video sent to Colombian journalists, injects US enforcement into the final days of the campaign.

Significance: Direct US enforcement action touching a candidate’s accuser heightens political and headline risk around the runoff, a factor for investors pricing post-election volatility and bilateral friction.

Sources: Colombia Reports

De la Espriella Campaign Paid $363,720 to Apparent ‘Ghost Company’ [Medium]

The de la Espriella campaign paid roughly COP1.3 million ($363,720) to Nova Soporte Integral, a company that had been liquidated in October 2023 and resurfaced in February, Cambio magazine reported on 17 June. Its legal representative was reportedly a Medellín college student.

Significance: Campaign-finance irregularities raise governance and legal-challenge risk for a potential incoming administration, a consideration for counterparties weighing policy continuity and contract enforceability.

Sources: Colombia Reports

BOLIVIA

Bolivia Blockade Crisis Death Toll Reaches at Least 16 as Government Calls Unions to Talks [High]

More than seven weeks of road blockades demanding President Rodrigo Paz’s resignation have left at least 16 dead, with the government on 17 June calling the Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB) to dialogue. By midday the COB had not confirmed attendance.

Paz has promulgated a law regulating states of exception but has so far held off deploying the army, betting on wearing protesters down; blockade points have fallen from roughly 90 to just over 50.

Significance: Prolonged blockades amid an acute foreign-currency shortage choke domestic trade and fuel supply, intensifying counterparty and sovereign-stability risk and complicating any near-term external financing.

Sources: Mercopress · Mercopress Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

ARGENTINA

Milei Reforms Supreme Court Appointment System by Decree [Medium]

President Javier Milei reformed by decree the system for appointing Supreme Court justices, eliminating a stage of citizen participation prior to nomination and removing the recommendation to weigh gender, specialty and regional-origin diversity. The 17 June measure was questioned by legal experts and judicial-sector organizations.

Significance: Executive consolidation over judicial appointments raises institutional and legal-predictability questions for investors weighing the durability of Milei-era reforms and contract enforcement.

Sources: Mercopress Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

CUBA

Cuban Vice FM Warns of US Military-Action Threats; Militarization Reported in Santiago [Medium]

Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Josefina Vidal said publicly that there are real threats of military action against Cuba and that Havana is preparing to defend the country, in remarks reported 17 June.

Separately, residents reported heavy militarization in Santiago de Cuba neighborhoods early on 18 June.

Significance: Rising US–Cuba security tension elevates sanctions and political risk, weighing on any residual remittance, travel and trade channels and on counterparties with Cuba exposure.

Sources: CubaNet · CiberCuba Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

Appeals Court Affirms Cubaexport Trademark Win Over Bacardi; 2024 Law May Limit It [Medium]

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on 16 June affirmed a ruling favoring Cuba’s Cubaexport over Bacardi in the long-running Havana Club trademark dispute, finding OFAC’s 2016 license validated Cubaexport’s 2005 renewal payment. Coverage notes the victory may be brief, as a 2024 US law could prevent future trademark renewal.

Significance: The decision underscores how OFAC licensing actions can directly determine ownership of valuable IP, a precedent relevant to dealmakers structuring Cuba-linked assets and brand rights.

Sources: Cuba Trade Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

OFAC’s live designation feed could not be retrieved today, but news sourcing confirms a major action.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) W25 - 18.06.26

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly important to the global economy. ¡Viva Las Améяicas!

Be sure to also visit Barbershop Whispers…Russia, a weekly newsletter on all things Russia. See the most recent issue:

Armenia Feels a Great Disturbance in the Force

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In last week’s BWA, I discussed Perú and its great power competition with the Panda and Uncle Sam - Citizen Ana de la Cruz’s election preference and her verdict. Ana will be the judge over the power competition - money in her pocket and food on the table, who is going to deliver it?

In this week’s BWA, I take our esteemed Barbers to Bolivia, the land of lithium, the critical mineral for global electrification that is desired by the global powers. After two decades of a non-market economy, the newly elected president, Rodrigo Paz, is blazing a path toward a free-market economy and leveraging the value of Bolivia’s vast lithium deposits. The global powers are at the table.

Bolivia Hits the Marketplace with White Gold

Cleaning House | White Gold | Friends with Benefits | The Fine Print | No Free Lunch

Takeaways

• The Unplayed Card – Bolivia sits atop the world’s richest lithium deposits and has never properly monetized them. Can President Paz recruit Uncle Sam to help monetize them?

• Regional Tell – The Country may be financially broke and landlocked, but newly elected President Rodigo Paz is setting terms with

  three great powers.

For twenty years, Evo Morales and Luis Arce associated Bolivia with Moscow, Havana, and Beijing – nationalizing resources, expelling the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and running a non-market economy that emptied the Bolivian treasury. Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz, sworn in last November, is now dismantling the socialist statist model piece by piece. Fuel subsidies, gone by decree, DEA is back, and the IMF program is being courted.

Bolivia is another fallen domino, in its own way, of the great game power competition - the US, Russia, and China - that has been taking place in the Americas over the past two decades. Much of the Americas is trending toward market-driven economics and political alignment with the US – Milei’s Argentina to Bukele’s El Salvador.

President Paz is following that path and exploiting the US foreign policy shift toward the Western Hemisphere to help him. He is using Bolivia’s vast lithium resources to recruit Uncle Sam in his battle against the drug cartels and Russian and Chinese influence, and to rebuild the economy.

Cleaning House

Rodrigo Paz took office in November 2025, ending two decades of rule by the Movement Toward Socialism, the party of Evo Morales and Luis Arce. He campaigned under the slogan “Capitalism for all,” and the vote breakdown suggested he had pulled part of the MAS base — Indigenous and working-class voters — across the aisle. That detail matters now, because some of them are now protesting in the streets.

Paz has inherited an economic basket case and a divided Congress. The nighttime thief, inflation, had climbed above 20% in 2025; foreign reserves had fallen to ~$4.5 billion; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects the economy to contract by around 3% in 2026. Paz governs without a reliable majority in Congress, which limits how much of his program can move through law rather than by decree.

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Executive Summary

The four most significant business and geopolitical developments in Las Améяicas last week were the further tightening of US sanctions on Cuba, the first cooperation between the US and the Venezuelan armed forces in two decades, an extra-constitutional congressional attempt to suspend President Petro, and the opening of a Citi representative office in Georgetown, Guyana.

• Cuban Sanctions – On 11 June 2026, OFAC added Cuba’s state oil monopoly Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) to the Specially Designated National (SDN) list.

• Venezuela Armed Forces – On 12 June, US and Venezuelan armed forces eliminated Tren de Aragua chief ‘Niño Guerrero’ in the Orinoco Mining Arc, signaling tactical security cooperation.

• Colombia – As the 21 June runoff between Abelardo de la Espriella and Iván Cepeda approaches, a legislator proposed an extra-constitutional congressional action to suspend President Petro.

• Guyana – Citi opens a representative office in Georgetown, Guyana.

  ---

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Takeaways of the Day

• Cuba — The most market-moving development yesterday was the U.S. designation of Cuba’s state oil monopoly CUPET on OFAC’s SDN List and parallel State Department sanctions under E.O. 14404.

• Venezuela — Caracas handed Shell a license for the cross-border Loran gas field shared with Trinidad while Delcy Rodríguez pushes a debt-restructuring narrative to creditors absent an IMF framework.

• Mercosur — Transitions to Uruguay’s pro tempore presidency on 30 June with EU quota distribution as the priority deal file.

• Guyana — Citi Group opens representative office in Georgetown. .

CUBA

OFAC Adds Cuba’s CUPET to SDN List; State Department Imposes Parallel Sanctions [High]

On 11 June 2026, OFAC added state oil monopoly Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) to the SDN List under E.O. 14404, with the State Department designating it for operating in Cuba’s energy sector. All CUPET property under U.S. jurisdiction is blocked, and the 50% rule extends blocking to majority-owned subsidiaries. The action lands while Exxon Mobil’s Libertad Act Title III claim against CUPET and Cimex sits before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Significance: The designation imposes severe secondary-sanctions exposure on any non-U.S. firm — including foreign financial institutions and traders — touching Cuban fuel logistics, freezing CUPET-linked counterparties out of dollar clearing and elevating diligence costs across the island’s energy supply chain.

Sources: Cuba Trade · Cuba Trade

Miami-Dade Revokes Vanguard Energy License Over CUPET Contract [Medium]

Miami-Dade revoked the license of Vanguard Energy, the firm that signed a contract with CUPET, with the move coinciding with CUPET’s addition to the SDN List. The action signals immediate enforcement spillover from the federal designation onto U.S.-based counterparties.

Significance: Demonstrates rapid downstream contagion for any entity contractually tied to CUPET; firms with existing Cuban energy exposure face license loss, contract nullification, and reputational risk almost immediately upon designation.

Sources: CubaNet

Cuban Thermoelectric Plants Lost 96,125 MW to Breakdowns in First Five Months of 2026 [Medium]

Data show Cuba’s energy crisis is driven not only by fuel imports but by the failure of aging generation infrastructure, which lost 96,125 MW to breakdowns through May 2026. The shortfall sustains rolling blackouts and social unrest, with protests reported in Havana neighborhoods.

Significance: Compounding the CUPET sanctions, infrastructure collapse signals a deteriorating sovereign-distress environment, dampening any near-term investment thesis on Cuban energy or tourism-linked assets dependent on reliable power.

Sources: ElToque

U.S. Fuel Exports to Cuba Reached US$24 Million January–April 2026 [Medium]

Licensed U.S. petroleum-product exports to Cuba totaled roughly US$24 million from January through April 2026, spanning gasolines, light fuel oils, kerosene, and lubricants shipped chiefly from Miami and Houston-Galveston. The flows precede the CUPET SDN designation.

Significance: These authorized trade channels now face heightened scrutiny post-designation, as any CUPET nexus in distribution could expose exporters to blocking actions and force restructuring of permitted humanitarian or commercial fuel flows.

Sources: Cuba Trade

VENEZUELA

Venezuela Grants Shell License for Cross-Border Loran Gas Field with Trinidad [High]

On 11 June 2026, Venezuela granted British major Shell a license for the first phase of exploration and exploitation of the Loran gas field, which holds seven reservoirs, six of which are transboundary with Trinidad and Tobago. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez led the signing at Miraflores, calling it a ‘historic step’ for a field undeveloped for 23 years.

Significance: The award reopens a major cross-border gas play and signals selective Western energy engagement with Caracas, though execution hinges on U.S. sanctions licensing and Trinidad coordination, leaving the deal’s monetization uncertain for counterparties.

Sources: Mercopress

Delcy Rodríguez Pushes Debt-Restructuring Narrative to Reassure Creditors [Medium]

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez is advancing a restructuring push aimed at reassuring creditors. Analysts warn that without a careful plan and an IMF-backed framework, Caracas risks losing control of the process.

Significance: Signals potential re-engagement with bondholders, but absent multilateral anchoring the credibility gap keeps Venezuelan debt instruments speculative and FX/recovery assumptions highly uncertain.

Sources: Caracas Chronicles

Guyana

Citi Opens Representative Office in Georgetown [High]

Citi has received regulatory approval from the Bank of Guyana to establish a representative office in Georgetown, marking a significant development in the country’s expanding financial sector.
In a statement published on its website on Friday, Citi said the approval allows Citibank, NA, to formally establish a presence in Guyana after maintaining business relationships with the country for nearly three decades without a physical office.
According to the company, the move is intended to strengthen its support for Guyana’s rapidly growing economy, particularly in areas such as infrastructure development and export financing.

Sources: Guyana Times

COLOMBIA

Congresswoman Illegally Attempts to Suspend President Petro Before Runoff [High]

House Representative Gloria Arizabaleta ordered the provisional suspension of President Gustavo Petro until 21 June, bypassing all legally required steps. She was subsequently removed from Congress and is under investigation by the Procuraduría for exceeding her authority; Representative Agmeth Escaf was also suspended.

Significance: The institutional confrontation nine days before the runoff raises political and governance risk, injecting volatility into the COP and Colombian assets as markets weigh the stability of the executive ahead of the 21 June vote.

Sources: Colombia Reports · El Tiempo

Court Curbs De la Espriella Use of National Symbols; Cepeda Files Paramilitary Complaint [High]

The Superior Court of Bogotá gave far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella 24 hours to stop using national symbols and the word ‘patria’ in his campaign. Separately, leftist candidate Senator Iván Cepeda filed a criminal complaint alleging De la Espriella’s ties to the defunct AUC paramilitary group.

Significance: Intensifying legal warfare between the two runoff contenders heightens contested-outcome risk, a key variable for investors pricing post-election policy direction on energy, fiscal, and trade fronts.

Sources: Colombia Reports · Colombia Reports

BRAZIL

Lula Hands Over 18 New Quilombola Land Titles Covering 11,600 Hectares [Medium]

President Lula delivered 18 new quilombola territorial titles to nine communities across six states, covering 11,600 hectares and benefiting 1,780 families. The administration has now issued 74 titles spanning 93,000 hectares, about 34% of all quilombola titles in Brazilian history, with R$19 million in housing credit released for the Kalunga community.

Significance: Expanded land-titling and rural credit signal continued agrarian and social-spending priorities under Lula, with localized implications for land-use, agribusiness boundaries, and ESG-linked investment considerations in affected states.

Sources: Agencia Brasil

MERCOSUR/REGIONAL

Uruguay Assumes Mercosur Pro Tempore Presidency with EU Quota Distribution as Priority [High]

Uruguay will take over the Mercosur pro tempore presidency on 30 June at a summit in Paraguay, prioritizing the distribution of quotas under the EU-Mercosur agreement. Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin said technical teams are already working and the issue must be closed before the end of September.

Significance: Advancing EU-Mercosur quota allocation is a material trade-flow catalyst for regional agricultural and industrial exporters, with the September deadline setting a near-term timeline for tariff and market-access clarity.

Sources: Mercopress

Argentina’s Adorni Declares 944 Million Pesos in Assets Amid Enrichment Probe [Medium]

Argentina’s Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni declared assets of 944.6 million pesos (about US$653,000) for 2025 before the Anti-Corruption Office, with debts of 317.3 million pesos and net worth near 627 million. The filing, now public, for the first time incorporates properties that surfaced in a judicial investigation for alleged illicit enrichment.

Significance: Governance scrutiny of a senior Milei official adds a layer of political risk that could affect the administration’s reform credibility, a factor for investors tracking Argentine fiscal and FX trajectory.

Sources: Mercopress

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

OFAC’s live designation feed could not be retrieved today, but news sourcing confirms a major action: on 11 June 2026 OFAC added Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET) to the SDN List under [CUBA-EO14404], with the State Department imposing parallel sanctions under E.O. 14404 Section 2(a)(i)(A) for operating in Cuba’s energy sector. The 50% rule extends blocking to any entity majority-owned by CUPET, and the State Department explicitly warned foreign persons — including foreign financial institutions — that dealings in Cuba’s energy, defense, metals/mining, financial services, or security sectors carry secondary-sanctions risk. The designation cross-references the pending U.S. Supreme Court Libertad Act Title III litigation (Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex/CUPET, 24-699), where Exxon holds the 8th-largest certified claim (US$71.6 million) against Cuba. Immediate enforcement spillover is already visible in Miami-Dade’s revocation of Vanguard Energy’s license over its CUPET contract.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

V01, No 3: BWA (Daily Brief) 12.06.26

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Takeaways of the Day

• Peruvian Elections — The most market-relevant development is the razor-thin Peruvian presidential runoff, where conservative Keiko Fujimori edged ahead of leftist Roberto Sánchez (50.002% vs 49.999%) after expat ballots flipped the count, leaving Andean FX and equity sentiment on a knife’s edge pending final certification.

• Energy – A sharpening US-Iran military exchange, with Tehran declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed, injects acute upside risk into global oil prices—materially affecting net energy importers across the region while benefiting crude exporters.

• Colombian Elections – Escalating institutional friction—an illegitimate congressional attempt to suspend President Petro and court orders against far-right runoff candidate De la Espriella—heighten political risk premia ahead of the 21 June second round.

• Cuban Energy – Deepening fuel crisis is being partially met by US private-sector imports via Coral Gables-based Vanguard Energy, a structural shift in who controls the island’s fuel market.

CUBA

US Private Fuel Imports to Cuba Scale Up Via Vanguard Energy Deal [High]

Cuba’s private sector imported US fuel worth $6.8 million in early 2026, and a recent agreement with Coral Gables-based Vanguard Energy to supply petroleum tankers could multiply that figure. The deal involves leasing storage facilities from the Cuban government and could redefine control of the island’s fuel market.

Significance: A growing legal US-to-Cuba private fuel channel reshapes counterparty dynamics and creates new commercial exposure for US-based intermediaries operating within sanctions carve-outs.

Sources: Havana Times ElToque Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

Lula and Sheinbaum Reaffirm Non-Intervention Amid Trump Pressure on Colombia and Cuba [Medium]

The leftist presidents of Brazil and Mexico held a 40-minute videoconference to jointly defend the principle of non-interference, amid US pressure on Colombia and Cuba. The coordination underscores a shared regional posture against Washington’s interventions.

Significance: A Brazil-Mexico diplomatic alignment against US pressure signals potential friction in hemispheric trade and policy coordination, relevant for cross-border investment and trade negotiations.

Sources: El Pais America

VENEZUELA

Delcy Rodríguez Pushes Debt Restructuring to Reassure Creditors [Medium]

Venezuela’s recent restructuring push, led by Delcy Rodríguez, seeks to reassure holders of defaulted debt. Analysts warn that without a careful plan and an IMF-backed framework, Caracas risks losing control of the process.

Significance: A credible restructuring path could reprice deeply distressed Venezuelan debt, but absent an IMF anchor, creditor recovery prospects and any normalization of sovereign exposure remain low-confidence.

Sources: Caracas Chronicles Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

Diaspora Return Sentiment Builds as Concerts Draw Venezuelans Home [Low]

Shows by Danny Ocean and Rawayana are helping Venezuelans abroad reimagine returning to the country, signaling shifting diaspora sentiment. The trend reflects a tentative perception that going home feels possible again.

Significance: Any sustained diaspora return could ease labor shortages and lift domestic consumption, though it remains a soft, sentiment-driven indicator rather than a confirmed economic shift.

Sources: Caracas Chronicles

COLOMBIA

House Representative Illegally Orders Petro’s Suspension [Medium]

Representative Gloria Arizabaleta, a member of the Accusations Committee, ordered the provisional suspension of President Gustavo Petro until 21 June at 4PM, bypassing all steps required to give the decision legal validity. The move is widely characterized as procedurally illegitimate.

Significance: An extra-constitutional attempt to suspend the sitting president sharply elevates Colombian political and institutional risk ahead of the runoff, pressuring the peso and sovereign risk premia.

Sources: Colombia Reports

Court Bars De la Espriella From Using National Symbols in Campaign [Medium]

The Superior Court of Bogota gave far-right runoff candidate Abelardo de la Espriella 24 hours to stop using national symbols and the word ‘patria’ in his campaign, effectively banning the campaign’s name ‘Defensores de la patria.’ The ruling comes days before the 21 June second round.

Significance: Judicial intervention against a finalist candidate adds legal uncertainty to the runoff outcome, a key driver of near-term Colombian asset and FX pricing and volatility.

Sources: Colombia Reports Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

Cepeda Campaign Launches Vote-Buying Probe Against De la Espriella [Medium]

Leftist candidate Senator Ivan Cepeda appointed an attorney to investigate alleged vote-buying and financial irregularities by his far-right opponent Abelardo de la Espriella. The campaign says it received information about possible illegal activities.

Significance: Mutual accusations of campaign-finance illegality raise the risk of a contested result, which could delay clarity for investors positioning around the runoff.

Sources: Colombia Reports

PERU

Fujimori Edges Ahead of Sánchez in Razor-Thin Runoff [High]

Conservative Keiko Fujimori reclaimed first place in Peru’s presidential runoff, reaching 50.002% against 49.999% for leftist Roberto Sánchez, with 98.2% of tally sheets processed—a margin of fewer than a thousand votes. The shift was driven by ballots from Peruvians abroad. If the trend holds, Fujimori would become Peru’s first woman elected president.

Significance: A wafer-thin result raises the risk of a contested outcome and prolonged uncertainty, keeping the sol, mining-linked equities, and copper-exposed positioning highly sensitive until certification.

Sources: Mercopress · El Pais America · El Nacional Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

MERCOSUR/REGIONAL

US-Iran Strikes Escalate; Tehran Declares Strait of Hormuz Closed [High]

The US and Iran exchanged attacks for a second consecutive day, with Centcom citing ‘unjustified and continued Iranian aggression’ and Trump threatening another round of strikes. Tehran declared the Strait of Hormuz completely closed, opening a dangerous new phase in the conflict.

Significance: A closure or threatened closure of Hormuz risks a sharp oil-price spike, benefiting regional crude exporters but raising import costs and inflation pressure for net energy importers across LatAm.

Sources: El Pais America · BBC Mundo Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

No new Cuba-, Venezuela-, or Colombia-related OFAC designations were recorded in the past seven days.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

V01, No 2: BWA (Daily Brief) 11.06.26

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly important…

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Las Améяicas Daily Business Brief is a collection of the most important daily events reported by select open-source media platforms and governments in the Améяicas.

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Executive Summary

The most consequential development this week is the US administration’s 4 June 2026 escalation of secondary sanctions on Cuba under US Presidential Order (E.O.) 14404, designating President Díaz-Canel, his family, Alejandro Castro Espín, Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (MINFAR), the Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (CDR), Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP), and gold-mining JV Minera La Victoria, while OFAC’s new FAQ 1258 extends sanctions exposure to non-US persons transacting with GAESA/MININT/MINFAR and their 50%-plus owned Cuba Restricted List (CRL) entities. The fallout is already material: Meliá, Iberostar, Blue Diamond and Archipelago International are exiting their Cuban hotel ventures, a Visa/Mastercard processing bank has withdrawn, and German/French shippers plus the World Food Programme (WFP) face logistics paralysis. In Colombia, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) confirmed first-round results with no fraud, setting up a polarized second-round runoff between far-right Abelardo de la Espriella—endorsed by Trump—and leftist Iván Cepeda, raising sovereignty and intervention concerns. Venezuelan interim President Delcy Rodríguez is floating a debt-restructuring strategy to reassure creditors, though analysts warn it lacks an IMF-backed framework. Brazil-US friction continues over tariffs and the PIX payment system, with a governing-coalition delegation lobbying Washington against what it calls politically motivated measures. A regional theme of alleged US intervention now spans Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and electoral Peru.

English Language Brief

CUBA

US Administration Designates Cuban President Díaz-Canel, MINFAR and Gold JV Under E.O. 14404 [High]

On 4 June 2026 the State Department and OFAC designated five individuals and five entities, including President Miguel Díaz-Canel, his wife Lis Cuesta, stepson Manuel Anido Cuesta, Alejandro Castro Espín, MINFAR, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, ICAP, Amistur Cuba SA, and gold-mining venture Minera La Victoria SA. OFAC also issued FAQ 1258 confirming GAESA, MININT and MINFAR are blocked and that non-US persons face sanctions risk for dealing with them or their 50%-plus owned CRL entities.

Significance: Secondary-sanctions exposure now reaches foreign banks and companies dealing with the bulk of Cuba’s state economy, sharply raising counterparty and sanctions risk and effectively closing the island to compliant foreign investment.

Source: Cuba Trade ElToque

Meliá, Iberostar, Blue Diamond and Archipelago Exit Cuban Hotels [High]

Facing a Friday deadline to exit ventures tied to military conglomerate GAESA, Spanish operators Meliá (15 hotels) and Iberostar (12 hotels for Gaviota), Canada’s Blue Diamond and Indonesia’s Archipelago International announced withdrawals. A bank processing Visa and Mastercard transactions also pulled out, and German and French shipping lines had already announced exits.

Significance: The exodus removes hard-currency tourism revenue from GAESA and the state, deepening Cuba’s FX and fiscal crisis while signaling that compliance risk now outweighs returns for foreign hospitality and payments counterparties.

Source: Cuba Trade ElToque

Sunwing Suspends All Cuba Operations Indefinitely [Medium]

On 5 June 2026, Sunwing announced it was indefinitely suspending all operations in Cuba, a measure covering Sunwing Vacations, WestJet Vacations and Vacances WestJet Québec. The move follows fuel-supply constraints and airline cancellations earlier in the year.

Significance: The loss of a major Canadian tour operator further erodes inbound tourist flows and air connectivity, compounding the collapse of Cuba’s largest source of foreign-exchange earnings.

Source: CubaNet

Germany Issues Stern Travel Warning on Cuba [Low]

Germany issued a strong advisory regarding travel to Cuba, citing deteriorating conditions on the island. The warning adds to mounting international concern over shortages, blackouts and logistics breakdowns.

Significance: Official advisories from key European source markets further depress tourism demand, accelerating the FX squeeze on Cuba’s already-collapsing hospitality sector.

Source: CiberCuba

VENEZUELA

Delcy Rodríguez Pitches Debt-Restructuring Strategy to Creditors [Medium]

Vice President Delcy Rodríguez is advancing a debt-restructuring push intended to reassure creditors holding Venezuela’s defaulted obligations. Analysts warn that without a careful plan and an IMF-backed framework, Caracas risks losing control of the process.

Significance: Any credible restructuring signal affects pricing of distressed Venezuelan sovereign and PDVSA paper, but the absence of an IMF anchor and persistent sanctions keep counterparty and execution risk elevated for bondholders.

Source: Caracas Chronicles

Analysts See Security-Apparatus Model as Core Obstacle to Reconstruction [Medium]

Caracas Chronicles argues the single greatest obstacle to Venezuelan reconstruction is neither economic nor regulatory but the governance model controlled by the figure who commands the security apparatus. The analysis frames this as a shared problem for both Wall Street and Chinese investors.

Significance: The piece underscores that political-control risk, not just sanctions, deters Western and Chinese capital alike, dampening prospects for any near-term reconstruction or energy-investment thesis.

Source: Caracas Chronicles

COLOMBIA

Electoral Court Confirms First-Round Results, Finds No Mass Fraud [High]

Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) confirmed the presidential first-round outcome after finding no evidence of the fraud alleged by outgoing President Gustavo Petro. The ruling sets up a runoff between far-right lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella and leftist Senator Iván Cepeda.

Significance: Institutional confirmation reduces near-term political-instability risk and provides clarity for the COP/FX outlook, though a polarized runoff keeps tail risks on fiscal and energy policy in play.

Source: Colombia Reports

Trump Endorses De la Espriella; Cepeda Warns of Intervention [High]

US President Donald Trump endorsed far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella ahead of the second round via Truth Social. Iván Cepeda called the endorsement “somewhat interventionist” and accused his rival of unpatriotic actions seeking foreign intervention in the election.

Significance: The endorsement injects US bilateral-relations risk into the runoff; a De la Espriella win could ease trade and counter-narcotics tensions with Washington, while heightened sovereignty rhetoric raises political-risk volatility for the peso.

Source: Colombia Reports

BRAZIL

Government Coalition Lobbies Washington Against Tariffs and PIX Measures [Medium]

A delegation of governing-coalition federal deputies representing 114 lawmakers visited Washington from 3 to 5 June 2026 to counter the Brazilian right’s narratives and contest US tariffs and measures targeting the PIX payment system. They delivered documents defending Brazilian sovereignty and arguing the tariffs and PIX actions lack technical-legal basis and are politically motivated.

Significance: Escalating US-Brazil friction over tariffs and the central-bank PIX system raises trade-policy and payments-infrastructure risk; Brasília’s insistence that PIX is non-negotiable signals limited room for compromise on financial-sovereignty issues.

Source: Agencia Brasil

Fachin Rejects Bid to Disqualify Justice for Banco Master CPI Ruling [Medium]

Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) President (Chief Justice in US speak) Edson Fachin rejected a request by four senators to disqualify Justice Kassio Nunes Marques from ruling on a writ seeking creation of a congressional inquiry (CPI) into Banco Master scandal. Fachin held the recusal request was filed past the regimental deadline. The CPI requirement reportedly carries 53 signatures, above the 27-signature threshold.

Significance: Continued legal uncertainty around the Banco Master inquiry keeps counterparty and governance risk elevated in the Brazilian banking sector, of relevance to creditors and investors exposed to mid-tier lenders.

Source: Agencia Brasil

MERCOSUR/REGIONAL

Fear of US Intervention Spreads Across Mexico, Brazil and Colombia [Medium]

El País reports that progressive governments in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia—amid imminent or ongoing electoral processes—are embracing accusations of US interference as pressure from the White House escalates. The narrative ties together tariff disputes, election endorsements and sanctions actions across the region.

Significance: A region-wide sovereignty-versus-intervention narrative raises bilateral-relations and policy-uncertainty risk, with potential spillover into trade negotiations, FX volatility and cross-border investment sentiment.

Source: El Pais America

Peru Runoff Tightens as Anti-Fujimorism and Southern Vote Resurge [Medium]

El País reports that leftist candidate Roberto Sánchez is seeking to mobilize anti-fujimorism and the southern Peruvian vote in the final stretch of the runoff against Keiko Fujimori, who is running for the presidency for a fourth time on a hardline security platform.

Significance: Peru’s polarized runoff keeps political-risk premia elevated for the sol and for mining-sector investors, given divergent policy trajectories on taxation and the extractive sector.

Source: El País America

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

While the source data notes no NEW Cuba/Venezuela/Colombia OFAC designations in the trailing 7-day window of the standard monitor, the 4 June 2026 actions under E.O. 14404 are highly material and corroborated by State Department and OFAC primary documents. OFAC added to the SDN List: Manuel Anido Cuesta, Raul Alejandro Castro Calis, Alejandro Castro Espín, Lis Cuesta Peraza, and Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, plus entities Amistur Cuba SA, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP), Minera La Victoria SA (a gold JV originally tied to Australia’s Antilles Gold and SOE Geominera), and MINFAR. The accompanying FAQ 1258 (released 4 June 2026) is the critical compliance development: it confirms GAESA, MININT and MINFAR are blocked under E.O. 14404 and that non-US persons—including foreign financial institutions—face sanctions exposure for transacting with these entities or any entity 50% or more owned directly or indirectly by them, including many Cuba Restricted List names. This directly explains the simultaneous corporate exits (Meliá, Iberostar, Blue Diamond, Archipelago, the Visa/Mastercard processing bank, and German/French shippers) detailed in the Cuba section: counterparties are pre-emptively de-risking. Enhanced due diligence against the CRL is now effectively mandatory for any non-US person with Cuba exposure. No new Venezuela or Colombia designations were identified this cycle, though the Alex Saab-related electoral commentary out of Colombia warrants continued monitoring.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

V01, No 1: BWA (Daily Brief) 06.06.26

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers… Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly importan…

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Publisher’s Note:

The US Administration has revived the Monroe Doctrine and has begun to act, as demonstrated with the US extraction of former president Nicolás Maduro from Caracas to a NY prison in January 2026. Uncle Sam has now turned its attention to Cuba, once the sugar king of the world. In this spirit, I asked William Messina, Jr., an agricultural economist with decades of experience in Cuban agriculture, to share his thoughts on Cuba’s food crisis and the future of Cuban agriculture.

About the Author:

William A. Messina, Jr. is an agricultural economist in the Food and Resource Economics Department at the University of Florida’s Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS). His work focuses on agricultural trade, development, and marketing issues important to Florida agriculture.

He is Co-founder and Director of a research initiative^[1], begun in 1992, that provides data and analysis on Cuba’s agricultural and fisheries sectors in collaboration with the University of Havana and other Cuban institutions. In 1999, he and co-founder and director Dr. Jose Alvarez received the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Special Honor Award for research on the challenges and opportunities of resuming trade with Cuba.

He previously spent 11 years in private agribusiness and holds degrees from Cornell University (B.S.) and the University of Florida (M.S.).

Cuban Agriculture – Down but Not Out (Yet)

Today, one can hardly fail to be aware of the tremendous economic and political challenges facing Cuba. However, press coverage and reports tend to focus on oil shortages and power blackouts across the island without acknowledging that Cuba is experiencing a true food emergency.

Cuba’s food crisis is primarily driven by two fundamental problems that have persisted since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and have intensified in recent years:

1. Limited and declining domestic agricultural production; and

2. A severe fiscal and foreign exchange crisis that is constraining the country’s ability to import critically important food supplies to feed the Cuban people. As far back as 2007 Cuban government officials acknowledged needing to import over 80 percent of its food requirements.^[2]

“Sin Azúcar no hay País” (Without sugar, there is no country)^[3]

Cuba has a rich agricultural tradition that began shortly after European colonization. Colonial powers placed emphasis on production of sugar, and to a lesser degree tobacco, for export to Europe. The emphasis on sugar production prevailed over time, until very recently. Volumes have been written about the complex history of the Cuban sugar industry with its booms and busts, and because of the sugar industry’s historically dominant role in Cuba’s agricultural footprint and, indeed, the economy more generally, when discussing Cuban agriculture, sugar must be considered separately from the rest of Cuba’s agricultural profile.

After World War II, the United States was purchasing large volumes of sugar from Cuba at preferential prices. But following the 1959 Cuban Revolution, as U.S.-Cuban relations began to deteriorate, the United States terminated its sugar purchases from Cuba. At that point, the Revolutionary government of Fidel Castro initiated a process to move away from the sugarcane monoculture – that is until the Soviet Union offered high, preferential prices for all the sugar that Cuba could produce. This pricing arrangement came to form the basis of Soviet subsidization of the Cuban economy which is estimated to have been as high as $6 billion per year in the late 1980s as the Soviets purchased high priced sugar from Cuba and sold them oil at less than world prices. This preferential trading arrangement enabled Cuba to purchase food to feed the Cuban people along with agricultural inputs for both sugar and non-sugar agricultural production, as well as a wide range of important industrial inputs. So, it could be said that sugar (via Soviet subsidies) was powering the entire post-Revolutionary Cuban economy.

At times, the Soviets were paying more than ten times the world price for Cuban sugar. Such high prices, coupled with the constraints and bureaucracy of Cuba’s central planning system, allowed the Cuban sugar industry to become extremely inefficient. Therefore, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba immediately lost its preferential trading arrangements for sugar exports and oil imports and, because the Cuban sugar industry was so inefficient, it could not compete selling its sugar on the world market, nor was it able to find another customer to purchase its sugar at preferential prices.

In the late 1980s, Cuba was the third largest sugar producer in the world behind Brazil and India. However, Brazil and India consume most of their sugar domestically, so Cuba was the largest sugar exporter in the world by a wide margin. Today, Cuba’s sugar industry is a shambles, producing only about two percent of the volume of sugar it produced in the 1989/90 season – the lowest volume in nearly two centuries – and the island presently must import sugar.

During the 1980s, Cuba’s sugar exports to the Soviet Union were generating approximately 80 percent of Cuba’s total export earnings. With the loss of Soviet purchases, the catastrophic loss of export revenue meant that Cuba began to struggle to purchase the food imports necessary to feed the population. Moreover, the country’s ability to import a wide range of essential imports for the broader economy was severely constrained. Thus, the sudden loss of Soviet subsidies, drove the decline and eventual collapse of Cuba’s sugar industry directly leading to Cuba’s current severe fiscal and foreign exchange crisis. This brings to mind the famous quote by the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher:

“The trouble with socialism is that eventually you run out of other people’s money.”

While some may argue to the contrary, the prospects for a major recovery of Cuba’s sugar industry in the near to medium term appear limited for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, reinvigorating the industry would require immense investment (to completely rebuild dilapidated mills and infrastructure) and under most any circumstances Cuba would be viewed as a high-risk country for investment because of its economic and political instability.^[4] Moreover, investment to significantly increase global sugar supplies would not appear justified given current conditions in the world sugar market. There are, however, some very particular circumstances under which this situation could change.

Structure of Cuba’s Food System and the Nature of the Food Crisis

Prior to Cuba’s 1959 Revolution, there were segments of the population which were consistently food insecure. The new government wanted to ensure that all citizens had enough food to eat so it established new policies managing food supplies. This involved the establishment of a State food collection and distribution agency, Unión Nacional de Acopio, or just Acopio.

At the same time, the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) instituted production quotas for all farms for crops that had to be sold to Acopio. These food supplies are, in turn, sold to Cubans through state-run neighborhood stores called Bodegas where people use ration books (Libretas de Abastecimiento or simply Libretas) issued by the government to purchase, at very inexpensive, subsidized prices, volumes of food staples sufficient to satisfy their monthly food requirements.

Cuban farmers were paid for these quota food supplies at government-determined prices (which did not always adequately consider production costs). Also, as partial compensation to farmers for their quota volumes, Acopio provided fertilizers and other agricultural inputs to farms which satisfied their quotas.

As long as Cuba’s preferential trading relationship with the Soviet Union remained in place, this system to supply the Cuban people with necessary food supplies functioned adequately. However, as Cuba’s fiscal crisis deepened following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Cuba’s ability to purchase imported fertilizer and other agrichemical inputs for farmers was constrained, and as these supplies declined, domestic food production decreased. Furthermore, financial limitations restricted Cuba’s ability to import food products necessary to supplement the Acopio supplies in the Bodegas. Thus, the food crisis facing Cuba today.

Prospects for the Future of Non-Sugar Agriculture in Cuba: Feeding the People

Because of the heavy emphasis on sugar production in Cuba, production of non-sugar agricultural food supplies had not historically received much focus. Nevertheless, the prospects for non-sugar agriculture in Cuba represent a vastly different story than sugar as there is potential for a significant recovery in domestic food production in the near term with appropriate, more market-oriented policies in place.

Despite Cuba’s fixation with central planning and control, the Cuban government has some direct experience with how well market forces can function and how they generate increased economic activity. Examples include allowing citizens to open private restaurants (paladares) beginning in 1993 and permitting people to rent rooms in their homes (casas particulares) to tourists and visitors starting in 1997.

Experiments with private sector activity and market forces also were implemented in Cuba’s agricultural and food system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural production began to decline in 1992. Cuban government officials quickly recognized that yields on immense State Farms were lower than those in the small sector comprised of smaller-scale agricultural production cooperatives and private farms. In response, in 1993 the government began breaking up many of the State Farms into smaller production cooperatives known as Unidades Básica de Producción Cooperativa (UBPCS).

Furthermore, in 1994 the Cuban government permitted the establishment of Mercados Agropecuarios where farmers were permitted to sell “surplus production” at free market prices.

With this combination of policy changes farmers began to experience the incentives offered by market forces, and non-sugar agricultural production reversed its downward trend, increasing nearly five-fold between 1994 and 2004 (Figure 1). At the same time, informal transportation systems developed to move food from farms to markets, and the food situation in Cuba improved significantly as marketplaces adapted and developed in dynamic fashion.

As early as the 1990s China and Vietnam had encouraged Fidel Castro that he could relax economic policies and without losing political control, but Fidel’s response was that this was not true for Cuba because “Cuba was different.” So, despite these positive experiences, when the Cuban government perceived private sector activity becoming too successful in the agricultural and food sector, they imposed new regulations to try to rein it in. Over time, these new restrictions, coupled with ever expanding shortages of agricultural inputs, failure of the government to pay farmers in a timely manner for quota food volumes they had to sell to Acopio, and damage from a series of hurricanes over consecutive seasons, resulted in non-sugar agricultural production volumes falling by over 70 percent, from 2004 to 2024 (Figure 1).

It should be noted that Cuba has a broad-based system of urban gardens using organic production practices (because of the lack of inputs) known as “organiponicos.” Some analysts have described this system as the most extensive experiment with organic agricultural production in the world, which may well be accurate. While the organiponicos clearly have met with considerable success, indications are that they will not be capable of feeding the country. So, without dismissing the organiponicos, a system utilizing more traditional agricultural production practices also should be considered to significantly boost domestic food production.

What Needs to be Done^[5]

The Cuban government is under tremendous pressure today given the economic crisis it is facing. Clearly it needs to do something, but the government seems paralyzed to make any meaningful changes. Over the past year, this pressure has been further intensified by statements and actions by the U.S. government. However, the U.S. Administration has been unclear about its objective with respect to Cuba. Comments from U.S. officials go all the way from “take over Cuba” to simply “they have to get new people in charge . . . like has happened in Venezuela.” These statements suggest two vastly different transitional scenarios for Cuba. But regardless of what sort of political or economic changes may or may not be implemented, the challenge of reinvigorating Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural production will remain critically important to help alleviate the current food crisis.

From the standpoint of someone who has had the opportunity to study Cuba’s agricultural and food system and personally witness it’s structure and function (or lack thereof) for over 30 years, the way to stimulate recovery of Cuban domestic food production would appear to be simply to make inputs accessible to farmers, permit them to manage their operations to achieve maximum possible production levels, and allow them access to markets where unregulated prices prevail. At times and places in Cuba where some semblance of these conditions has been allowed to develop, agriculture has been successful, even when relevant markets were far from perfect.

The importance of making inputs more readily available cannot be overemphasized as a basic first step to reinvigorate Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector. As a current example of the importance of having access to agricultural inputs, beginning in 2024, the Vietnamese company Agri VMA leased land in Cuba for rice production. Reports indicate that their operations have been highly successful, achieving yields of 7.2 metric tons of rice per hectare, more than 4.5 times higher than local average yields on Cuban rice farms. The reason for their success is that the company has been allowed to import its own inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment) and manage its production systems. From the Cuban perspective, the goal of the project is to reduce the need for imported rice, a staple in the Cuban diet. While the price Agri VMA is paid for its rice by the Cuban government has not been disclosed, it is lower than the cost of imported rice, so it saves Cuba money. At the same time, Agri VMA reports that the enterprise is profitable and the company is interested in expanding its rice operations in Cuba, even though they are having difficulty repatriating their earnings to allow them to purchase more inputs for existing operations.

Cuba’s well-established network of agricultural production cooperatives, small private farmers, and non-State cooperatives (i.e., UBPCs) offers an imperfect yet solid foundation for improving domestic food production if inputs are made available in a timely fashion. To enable Cuban farmers to purchase inputs, a credit system obviously will need to be arranged, but there are examples of such systems being effectively implemented in a number of developing countries throughout the world. An important concern, however, is that this promising base for domestic food production could be undermined if farms become tied up in lengthy legal processes dealing with issues related to compensation or restitution for expropriated property.

From the demand perspective, given that Cuba’s food ration system is nearly non-functional, considerable amounts of food aid will be necessary in the near to medium term as domestic food production and distribution systems rebuild. Fortunately, a wide range of international agencies, NGOs and foreign governments are already supplying food and other forms of humanitarian assistance to Cuba. Such efforts will need to continue.

Final Thoughts

An important framework exists for recovery of Cuba’s domestic food supply from non-state agricultural producers. While Cuba’s current leadership appears to continue to fear the private sector, there is much that they could learn from Vietnam if they will observe the tremendous accomplishments Vietnam has had in reinvigorating its agricultural sector through its “socialist-oriented market economy” Doi Moi reforms.

Cuba’s agricultural tradition goes back centuries, and the nation produced generation after generation of knowledgeable farmers and ranchers. A significant issue facing the nation presently is whether the country has potentially lost an entire generation of experienced farmers. Have young people who otherwise might have learned farming skills from their parents or the broader farming community left the farms and moved to urban areas in search of better work, or been part of the wave of emigration that has reduced Cuba’s population by perhaps as much as 15 percent over the past several years? The answer to this question could dramatically influence the outcome of any series of policy adjustments.

Finally, it is worth acknowledging that there is a cadre of exceptionally talented economists in Cuba who have training in market economics from Western European universities who know Cuban agriculture from extensive study, and who are intimately familiar with Cuba’s food system from living it every day. Lest we feel as though we have all the answers on this side of the Florida Straits, it would be valuable to ask them for their opinions on what should be done.

^[1] Founding Co-Director of the UF/IFAS collaborative research initiative with the University of Havana, Cuba, which was active from 1994 to 2023. However, in May of 2023 the collaboration was terminated following the State of Florida passing a law (Senate Bill 846) that prohibits state university faculty from working in or collaborating with faculty and scientists from communist “countries of concern,” specifically China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.

^[2] In February of 2007, Cuba’s Vice Minister of Economy and Planning Magalys Calvo publicly stated that Cuba imports 84 percent of the basic food requirements distributed to the Cuban people (http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2007/02/26/nacional/artic02.html, accessed February 28, 2007).

^[3] A phrase coined in the early 20^th century to emphasize the importance of the sugar industry to Cuba.

^[4] Even Florida Senator Rick Scott acknowledges the risks associated with investment in Cuba: “I’ve built businesses all my life, I invested all my life . . . “ You’re not going to invest in risk unless you’re an idiot. So, it’s going to take clear democracy, clear rule of law. People are not gonna put the money up. Not any significant amount” (https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/25/cuba-business-investment-00932562).

^[5] These recommendations focus primarily on crop production. Production of animal protein is a more complex and expensive enterprise and, while similar market-oriented policy changes are necessary to revitalize this sector, a more detailed assessment cannot be included in a brief of this length.

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Vol 1, No 12 - BWR (MT799 Améяicas) 01.06.2026

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers… Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly importan…

Read more

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers… Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly importan…

Read more

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers… Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly importan…

Read more

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers… Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly importan…

Read more